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In  the past, our energy transitions have occurred over long periods
of time.  It  took  60  years  to shift from  a wood  economy to  a coal
economy  and  60  years to shift  from  a coal economy to a petroleum
economy.
In  terms  of  our  resource  base  we  have  been  able to  make these
shifts  relatively  easily  - moving  from  domestic  wood  to  domestic
coal  to  domestic  oil  and  natural  gas.  Our  resource  availability  has
been  coincident  with  the movements  in technology.  Stated  another
way,  our  push  to  a  transportation  based  continental  economy  was
not  impeded  by a lack of liquid fuel when  the internal  combustion
engine became available  for improved transportation.
In  the  United  States  we  do  not have  an  overall  energy  problem.
What  we  do  have  is  a  severe  liquid  fuel  problem  where  our use  of
liquid  fuel  is  not  matched  by  our  domestic  liquid  fuel  resources.
About  47  percent  of  our  current  energy  consumption  is  in  the
form  of  oil  and  natural  gas  liquids,  26  percent  is  in  the  form  of
natural gas, 19 percent is in the form of coal, and  4 percent is nuclear.
Our basic  resources  are almost the opposite  with  87 percent  in coal
and  only  1  percent  each  for  natural  gas  and  oil  with  natural  gas
liquids.  We  have  a  basic  contradiction  between  the  availability  of
resources  and our use of them.
Two  routes  often  suggested  for  meeting  our  liquid  fuels  crisis
are  conservation  and  the  production  of  synthetics.  As  educators,
it  is  critical  to  point  out  the  limitations  and  necessary  conditions
for each of these.
For  conservation,  several  important  ones  are  only  partially  re-
flected  in most suggested  public  policy.  First, relative  prices  are the
key to incentives for conservation. The real price of high test gasoline
declined  overall  from  1967  to the fall of 1978,  and little  conserva-
tion  of  gasoline  fuel  was  observed  over  this  period.  Only with the
expectation  and  demonstration  of  a real  long term  upward  shift  in
relative  liquid fuel  prices  do we get sustained efforts at conservation.
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in  relative  liquid  fuel  prices  we  still  face  the  reality  of relatively
slow turnover  of the  capital  stock.  For example,  even  with the post
1978  relative  price  increases  in  gasoline,  the turnover  of the capital
stock  of automobiles  to more fuel efficient models has slowed down.
Part  of  this  relates  to  the  1980  recession,  and  part relates  to  in-
creased  relative  price  increases  in  the  very  capital  stock  that  is
supposed to turn  over  in response  to the  price  increases  in gasoline.
Consumer  behavior towards  the  energy  transition  has  been highly
rational  in  economic  terms,  while  sometimes  flying  in  the  face  of
the policy wishes of government leaders.
In the  production  of synthetics, our opportunities are much more
limited than  would  be expected  from the publicity attending liquids
from  shale,  coal,  and  alcohol.  At  the  same  time  their  relative  eco-
nomic  cost  might  not  be  as  high  as  direct  market  figures  might
indicate.
With  respect  to the extent of  opportunities, a number  of persons
subscribe  to a backstop  theory on liquid fuels. This means that if the
Arabs  raise  their  prices  to  a  certain  point,  then  it will  suddenly  be
economic  to  go  full  blast  with synthetics,  especially  coal  and  shale
liquids.  We will  then  have  all the liquids we need from these sources.
We  need  to  recognize  that  the lead  time for these  synthetic  fuel
plants  is very  long.  We  have not yet started  to construct  any  of the
giant  plants  engineers  claim  are  most  advantageous,  and  the  lead
time  for the first  several  of these plants is five to seven years.
Second,  as  we  greatly  expand  the  production  of  liquids  from
such  plants,  we  are  likely  to  face  some  increasing  costs  based  upon
such  things  as  transportation  and  materials  handling  bottlenecks
and  increased  environmental  costs  from  a  concentrated  increase
of such activities.
With  respect  to  the  comparative  costs  of  different  liquids,  this
depends  upon  what  method  of  cost  analysis  we  employ.  For  ex-
ample,  in looking  at the  price of imported oil we can take the OPEC
market  price,  be  it  $30 or $40 a barrel. However, there are a number
of costs borne by society as a whole from importing oil. One of these
is the political  vulnerability  to cut off, another  is  a negative balance
of  payments  account,  which  is  related  to  our  domestic  inflation
problem.  If these  sorts  of  costs  are  added  on,  then the full cost  of
imported  oil  might well  be  in the  $60 to $90  a barrel  range. Such a
price  might  make  investment  in  import  replacing  synthetics  eco-
nomic today.
Since  we  have  defined  our  problem  as  a liquid  fuel  problem,  we
might  also  look  at  ways  to help our liquid problem  without  neces-
sarily  producing  synthetic  liquids  or  by conserving  liquids directly.
There  are  some  approaches  here  which  need  to  be  investigated.
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routes  so that  coal  would be burned  as electricity in electric locomo-
tives  rather  than  as  oil in  diesel locomotives.  We find in  some cases
that  the  full  cost  of  electrification,  including  the  new  coal  fired
generating  capacity  to  run  the  system,  is less than the cost of pro-
ducing  coal  liquids  to  be  burned  in  the  existing  stock  of  diesel
locomotives.
Projections  of  future  energy  use  echo  many  of  these  points.
Change  to  the  year  2000  is  likely  to  be  gradual  and  evolutionary
rather  than  abrupt  and  revolutionary.  We will  cut back on the pro-
portion  of liquids  and  gas  fuels that we use.  We will probably double
the  proportion  of coal  that  we  use,  but  much  of this  increase  will
come  from  the  direct  use  of coal rather than from  coal  conversion
to  liquid  and  gas  fuels.  We  will  have  a  greater  diversity  of energy
sources,  but  the new  ones like  solar and  biomass will  still be minor
actors rather than major  players.
In  making  such  "conservative"  assessments,  it  is  critical  not  to
let  our  audiences  lose  sight  of  those  things  that  are  necessary  to
induce  change.  Gradual  change  can  be  relatively  painless.  Radical
change  often  requires  pain,  disruption,  or  other  incentives  which
force  us to  do  such  things  as  subsidize  massive investment  or turn
over  capital  stock  before  it is depreciated.  Hopes  for quick,  radical
technological  fixes  for  our  energy  problems  would  also  require  a
willingness  to  pay  high  costs  and  suffer  a  certain  amount  of  dis-
ruption.  Any realistic  set of alternative  routes for energy transitions
involves very real trade-offs. There is  no clear painless solution.
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